<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BSL</th>
<th>Work with Agents...</th>
<th>Practices</th>
<th>Safety Equipment (Primary Barriers)</th>
<th>Facilities (Secondary Barriers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1   | Not known to consistently cause disease in healthy adults.  
  * e.g. E. Coli (K-12 derived) | Standard microbiological practices  
  • Sharps policies must be implemented  
  • Lab supervisors must ensure staff are properly trained regarding their duties and the necessary precautions to prevent exposures | No primary barriers typically required  
  • Protective clothing recommended  
  • Protective eyewear and appropriate gloves, when hazardous work conducted | Lab doors for access control  
  • Non-porous, benches and furniture (easily decontaminated)  
  • Sink for handwashing |
| 2   | Associated with human disease  
  • Percutaneous, ingestion, and mucous membrane exposure routes  
  * e.g. Influenza, HIV, Lyme Disease | BSL-1 practices plus:  
  • Limited access  
  • Biohazard warning signs  
  • Lab-specific biosafety manual prepared and adopted as policy; defines agent-specific handling, waste/decontamination, medical surveillance, and exposure response procedures | BSCs or other physical containment devices for all work that can generate infectious aerosols or droplets  
  • PPE: Lab coat, gloves, face and eye protection, as needed. | Autoclave available  
  • Self-closing doors with locks  
  • Airflow should not recirculate to public areas |
| 3   | That are indigenous or exotic that may cause serious or potentially lethal disease through the inhalation route of exposure  
  * e.g. Tuberculosis, SARS CoV-2 | BSL-2 practices plus:  
  • Controlled access  
  • Decon of all waste  
  • Decon of all lab clothing before laundering | BSCs or other physical containment devices used for all open manipulation of agents  
  • Pass-thru autoclave with Bioseal required  
  • PPE: protective lab clothing, gloves, face, eye, and respiratory protection, as needed. | Physical separation between access corridors  
  • Self-closing, double-door access  
  • Inward airflow directionality (clean to dirty), no reversal during failure  
  • Lab entry through airlock or anteroom  
  • Hands-free sink  
  • All seams, floors, walls, & ceilings sealed |
| 4   | That are dangerous/exotic and pose high risk of aerosol transmission, infections that are frequently fatal, with limited prophylaxis/treatment available  
  • Unknowns with properties similar to RG4 agents  
  * e.g. Ebola Virus, Lassa | BSL-3 practices plus:  
  • Clothing change before entry  
  • Shower out  
  • Decon of all material before departing facility | All procedures in Class III BSCs or Class I/II combined with full-body, positively pressured suit | Class III BSC or Suit Lab setups  
  • Separate building or isolated zone  
  • pass through autoclave  
  • emergency power for all containment operations (HVAC, alarms, BSCs, entry/exit, etc.)  
  • Dedicated HVAC, vacuum, & decon systems |

*UA does not currently engage in BSL-3 work. Please contact the BSO with questions about risks associated with this research.*

*UA does not engage in BSL-4 work. Contact the BSO.*